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"INNESOTA LAW REVIEW
CRUELTY AS A GROUND FOR DIVORCE IN
MINNESOTAt
By ROBERT KINGSLEY*
A s has been common in most states, the first divorces in Min-
nesota were legislative in nature,' but this mode of pro-
cedure seems to have ceased in 1851,2 so that the constitutional
prohibition thereof in 1857' had been anticipated in practice. The
first general divorce law set out six grounds for divorce: adultery,
impotency, imprisonment in the penitentiary, wilful desertion,
cruel and inhuman treatment, and habitual drunkenness.4 This
act was amended in 1855, by adding the following sweeping
provision:
"When it shall be made fully to appear that from any other
reason or causes existing, the parties cannot live in peace and
happiness together, and that their welfare requires a separation."'
*Professor of Law, University of Southern California; formerly
(1926-1927) Instructor in Law, University of Minnesota.
tThis article is one of a series of similar articles on cruelty as a
ground for divorce. For other articles in the series consult: (1929) 8
Mich. State Bar Jour. *196, (1929) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 266. This series,
the writer believes, is a necessary first step toward a proper discussion of
the nature of cruelty as a ground for the severance of marital ties. It
is felt that it is necessary for any work to proceed along the line of
discovering first what the present state of the law is before attempting
any real discussion of the "whys" or the "ought-to-bes."
Furthermore, because local statutes differ, it has seemed better to
attempt to make such purely analytical studies jurisdiction by jurisdiction.
These studies should in due course be followed by a general analytical
study of the whole country, comparing the facts as they are found in the
different states. When that has been done, the way will be cleared for
the real discussion. Save in occasional instances only an analytical
critique of the Minnesota cases has been made.
'Minn. Laws 1849, ch. 27, 28 & 30; 1851, ch. 20, 21, 22 & 23.
2At least no legislative divorces subsequent thereto are listed in Kelly,
Index-Digest of Minnesota Laws. It was in this year that the first general
divorce law was enacted. Minn. Rev. St. 1851, ch. 66, sec. 7, infra at
footnote no. 4.
3Minn. constitution, art. 4, sec. 28.
4Minn. Rev. St. 1851, ch. 66, sec. 7. This statute, in subdivision 5,
on cruelty read as follows: "Where the treatment of the wife by the hus-
band has been cruel and inhuman, whether practiced by using personal
violence, or by any other means; or when the wife shall be guilty to her
husband."
5Minn. Laws 1855, ch. 17, sec. 4 (7). Of this Act, Mr. Justice Fland-
rau said: "Previous to the year 1855, a divorce could only be granted for
six causes-adultery, impotency, imprisonment in the penitentiary of either
party, wilful desertion for one year, cruel and inhuman treatment, and
habitual drunkenness for a year. In 1855, to meet a particular case, the
legislature (as we think subsequent events have fairly proven) improvidently
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This extremely liberal statute was repealed by the revision of
1866, which eliminated entirely the new section thus added in
1855, and reduced the statement of the earlier statute to the
simple statement that:
"A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be adjudged and
decreed by the district court... for either of the following causes:
.. Third. Crel "and inhuman treatment;...
This provision-has remained unchanged until the present.'
To approach the construction of this' statute by a consideration
of the langwuage used by the court in its various decisions does
not seem to be productive of any very definite results. Depend-
ing as the court favored or disfavored a divorce in the case then
before it, it used liberal or strict language in its opinion. To
attempt to reconcile, for example, the following statement, taken
from a case in which a divorce was sustained:
"Clearly, matters between this husband and wife had reached
a state where living together was out of the question. The trial
court had the parties before it, and decided that defendant was
to blame for this condition. The evidence supports this decision
sufficiently to prevent our reversing the order refusing a new
trial." 0
with the following from a case in which the denial of a divorce
was in question:
"The record discloses an unfortunate condition of incompati-
bility, but we agree with the trial judge that both parties are at
added the following clause to the law: 'When it shall be made fully to
appear that from any other reason or causes existing, the parties cannot
live in peace and happiness together, and that their welfare requires a
separation." True v. True, (1861) 6 Minn. 458, 464.
6Supra, in footnote no. 4.
7Minn. Rev. St. 1866, ch. 62, see. 6.
sit has been. successively: Minn. Rev. St. 1866, ch. 62, sec. 6; Minn.
G. S. 1878, ch. 62, sec. 6; Minn. G. S. 1894, ch. 62, sec. 4790; Minn. Rev.
Laws 1905, sec. 3574; Minn. G. S. 1913, sec. 1711; and is now Mason's
1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8585.
9Apart from True v. True, (1861) 6 Minn. 458, supra in footnote no.
5, all the reported divorce cases seem to have arisen under the present
statute.
10Hertz v. Hertz, (1914) 126 Minn. 65, 67-68, 147 N. W. 825, 826.
Notice, also: "A continuance of the relations of husband and wife meant
to them continuous disorder, conflict, ill-will, harmful alike to themselves,
their children and the community in which they lived.' O'Neil v. O'Neil,
(1921) 148 Minn. 381, 384, 182 N. W. 438, 439-440, and the following
from a case granting a limited divorce under the statute which is now
Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat. sec. 8609; "If nothing but misery is to be
attained by living together, then what warrant is there in compelling the
continuance of that existence?" Widstrand v. Widstrand, (1902) 87 Minn.
136, 138, 91 N. W. 432, 433.
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fault, and that neither oLthem is entitled to release at the hands
of the court."'"
results in nothing which may be relied on as a guide in other
cases. The court, in each -instance, it is submitted, has stated
merely its conclusion in the form of a reason.
One other method of approach is, then, open, viz., to resort
to the facts of the individual cases as given in the reports, and to
attempt to deduce from that material the rules which actuate the
court in its decisions. Certain difficulties at once present them-
selves. We are dealing with the reports of cases in an appellate
court, whose problem is not: Shall a divorce be granted or denied?
but: Shall the action of the trial court be affirmed or reversed?
The problem thus created will be dealt with at a later point. 2 A
second problem is omnipresent, namely the multiplicity of facts
in most divorce cases. Rarely does a case present one allegedly
"cruel" fact situation apart from the presence of other, and com-
plicating, conduct. The court has, in fact, in at least one case,
intimated that acts, not of themselves serious, may by their ac-
cumulation over a period of years constitute cruelty in their
totality.13 However, for almost all the major situations, there
are cases in which a course of conduct is isolated; and, beyond
this, where a given act, or type of act, regularly appears in a
number of cases, accompanied by a variety of other conduct, it
would seem proper to regard this constant as, itself, at least a
serious constituent of cruelty. In any event, it seems worth-
while to attempt a classification of the kinds of conduct which,
2"Riebeling v. Riebeling, (1902) 85 Minn. 383, 88 N. W. 1103.
"Infra at p. 267.
-Mullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179, 182, 160 N. W. 494, 495:
"While, perhaps, no single act in the course of the years these parties
lived together would be sufficient to constitute what is known as cruel and
inhuman treatment, yet aside from the three specific acts of violence which
I think are fairly proven by the testimony, the constant and habitual course
of treatment by the defendant of his wife, consisting of neglect, and in
many instances amounting to contemptuous treatment, carping criticism,
habitually applied to her, taking this accumulation of the years it seems
to me to amount to one of the most insidious forms of cruelty, when applied
to a sensitive woman"; and see, O'Neil v. O'Neil, (1921) 148 Minn. 381,
384, 182 N. W. 438, 439: "Little differences between the husband and
wife, commencing early in their wedded life, were multiplied and en-
larged upon as time wore on, and at about the time of the commencement
of this action had grown into an irreconcilable conflict to be healed and
remedied only by the soothing and calming effect of a judgment and decree
of divorce." The cases involving "nagging," and similar conduct, infra,
footnote no. 52, are, of course, all examples of an accumulation of acts-
but these all of the same character.
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either singly or in connection with other misconduct, have ap-
peared in suits for divorce on the ground of cruelty.1'
Each case presents, analytically, two distinct problems: Has
the defendant's conduct been cruel objectively; and has it been
cruel subjectively? In other words, each case raises two points:
(1) Has the conduct here been such as ever, under any circum-
stances, and between any two people, can be denominated as
"cruel" and recognized as entitling the party towards whom it
was directed to a divorce; and (2) if so, was it "cruel" when
applied by this defendant to this complainant? Not every case
discusses both of these problems at length. The existence of one
or the other may be obvious, (or, in an appellate court, the record,
by failure to take exceptions, may be in such a condition that
only one aspect need be considered-the answer to the other ques-
tion being taken for granted). But, whether discussed or not,
an affirmative answer to both questions is implicit in every deci-
sion granting (or sustaining) a divorce.
1. OBJECTIVE CRUELTY
Turning first, then, to what I have called "objective cruelty."
The statute of 1851,1" as we have seen1" indicated a distinction
between cruel and inhuman treatment "practiced by using per-
sonal violence" and that practiced "by any other means." This
may well serve as a convenient division for the purposes of our
analysis."
Personal violence, in the form of a battery, committed by
one spouse on the other, universally has been treated as cruel."8
With this designation the Minnesota cases agree ;1O and, since the
14In the following footnotes I have indicated in parentheses the ac-
companying conduct in each case.
'
5Minn. Rev. St 1851, ch. 66, sec. 7.
loSupra, footnote no. 4.
17Consult the quotation from Williams v. Williams, (1907) 101 Minn.
400, 404, 112 N. W. 528, 530, infra, at footnote no. 27.
18 Consult, for example: Evans v. Evans, (1790) 1 Hagg. Cons. 35;
1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation 1527-1532.
19Westphal v. Westphal, (1900) 81 Minn. 242, 83 N. W. 988 (vile and
obscene language, attacks on parents, fraud) ; Cochran v. Cochran, (1904)
93 Minn. 284, 101 N. W. 179 (vile and obscene language, accusations of
adultery); Longbotham v. Longbotham, (1912) 119 Minn. 139, 137
N. W. 387 (public accusations of adultery); Rose v. Rose. (1916) 132
Minn. 340, 156 N. W. 664; see: Baier v. Baier, (1903) 91 Minn. 165, 97
N. W. 671 (profanity, neglect) ; Haver v. Hayer, (1907) 102 Minn. 235,
113 N. W. 382 (vile and obscene language, neglect) ; Gilman v. Gilman,
(1921) 150 Minn. 271, 185 N. W. 469 (nagging); Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka,(1927) 171 Minn. 213, 213 N. W. 919 (limited divorce, other conduct being
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line between actual and threatened violence-between battery and
assault,-although clean-cut in theory, is in this type of case al-
most indistinguishable, the cases have recognized, also, threats of
violence, whether put into action or not.20
But a technical battery, or assault, is not the only possible
attack on the physical integrity of the injured spouse. Other
types of conduct may also operate, directly, to produce physical
injury. The court has, therefore, recognized, at least for a limited
divorce, excessive demands for sexual intercourse ;21 and allega-
tions of neglect to provide food, clothing, suitable lodging, and
proper medical care are common.22
These, then, are the types of conduct constituting direct in-
juries to the person-personal violence-which have been pre-
sented to the Minnesota court and treated by it as objectively
cruel. Although, as we have seen, 23 the statute no longer con-
tains the provision referring to "other means" of practicing cruel
and inhuman treatment, the court has always treated cruelty as
something wider than mere physical violence. In an early case
2 4
the court recognized that, under a proper showing as to the sub-
jective aspects, a long continued course of nagging was ". . . about
as cruel and inhuman as it could have been without inflicting
present); and see: Colahan v. Colahan, (1902) 88 Minn. 94, 92 N. W.
1130, where the violence was found to have been excusable.
20See Longbotham v. Longbotham, (1912) 119 Minn. 139, 137 N. W.
387 (public accusations of adultery) ; and see: Haver v. Haver, (1907) 102
Minn. 235, 113 N. W. 382 (neglect, vile and obscene language).
21Grant v. Grant, (1893) 53 Minn. 181, 182, 54 N. W. 1059, where,
however, the court said: "Whether this would be reason for granting an
absolute divorce we need not decide." It seems probable, however, that the
court would recognize such conduct as ground for divorce a vincula when
a case arises. It has been generally so recognized in other states having
at least as strict an attitude as Minnesota. Consult: Kingsley, Cruelty
as a Ground for Divorce in Iowa, (1929) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 266, 270-271,
where the Iowa cases are collected and discussed; consult, also: Kingsley,
Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in the State of Michigan, (1929) 8 Mich.
State Bar Jour. *196, *201.
22See: Baier v. Baier, (1903) 91 Minn. 165, 97 N. W. 671 (vile
and obscene language and assault); Haver v. Haver, (1907) 102 Minn.
235, 113 N. W. 382 (assault, vile and obscene language); Heinze v.
Heinze, (1909) 107 Minn. 43, 119 N. W. 489 (vile language, permitting
insults by others); Mullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179, 160
N. W. 494 (nagging); Moulton v. Moulton, (1927) 172 Minn. 96, 214
N. W. 771 (permitting insults by others); and see, as a ground for
limited divorce: Bechtel v. Bechtel, (1907) 101 Minn. 511, 112 N. W. 883,
12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1100; Martinson v. Martinson, (1911) 116 Minn. 128
133 N. W. 460 (vile and obscene language, nagging).
23Supra, at footnotes nos. 4-8.
24Marks v. Marks, (1894) 56 Minn. 264, 57 N. W. 651, 45 Am. St
Rep. 466; Marks v. Marks, (1895) 62 Minn. 212, 64 N. W. 561.
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corporal punishment"25 ' and allowed a divorce; and in the famous
case of Williams a. WPi//ianuv the court said:
"There are two well-recognized classes of such misconduct
[cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the divorce
law.] The first is the obvious one of actual or threatened physical
violence of such character as to endanger life, limb, or health,
or to create a reasonable apprehension of it. . . The second is
such other equivalent and serious misconduct which, unjustified
in fact, is so plainly subversive of the relationship of husband and
wife as to make it impossible that the duties of married life should
be discharged, or its objects attained, and to be so hopelessly
inimical to the health or the personal welfare of the injured party
as to render continuance of the relationship intolerable.""
As a distinction from cruelty consisting of personal violence, the
label "mental cruelty" has been applied to this type of conduct.
At the outset, it may be convenient to refer to a group of
cases in which the conduct complained of either constituted, or
approximated, some other, and distinct, ground of divorce. No
case seems to have arisen in Minnesota in which actual adultery
was urged on the court as constituting cruelty; but in Tschida v'.
Tschida'2 8 the husband complained of conduct on the part of his
wife in associating with another man, under circumstances such
as to justify a belief that their relations were criminal, although
adultery was not alleged, nor was there an attempt to prove actual
adultery. Of this situation the court said:
"The effect upon ... [the husband] ... compelled to be absent
from the home when the situation was such, can well be imagined
. .. We think . . . [the wife's] . . . conduct with Clark justified
finding cruel and inhuman conduct warranting divorce."29'
The principal point of interest about this case is not its actual
decision, for in so holding the' court but followed the trend of
authority,3" but the language of the court in distinguishing two
25Marks v. Marks, (1895) 62 Minn. 212, 213, 64 N. W. 561.26(1907) 101 Minn. 411, 112 N. W. 528.
27Williams v. Williams, (1907) 101 Minn. 400, 404, 112 N. WV. 528.
530. Consult, also: Bechtel v. Bechtel, (1907) 101 Minn. 511, 112 N. W.
883, 12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1100; Mullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179,
182, 160 N. W. 494, 495; Gall v. Gall. (1925) 165 Minn. 291, 206 N. W. 450;
and cf.: -rdlicka v. Hrdlicka, (1927) 171 Minn. 213, 215, 213 N. W. 919,
920, where the court, granting a limited divorce, said: "This long course of
unkind words, swearing, vulgar accusations, disagreeable and penny-exacting
conduct sears and scars, provokes bitterness, breeds rebellion, creates
agony of mind and tends just as effectively as personal violence to produce
unbearable domestic misery."
28(1927) 170 Minn. 235, 212 N. W. 193, discussed in: (1927) 2
Notre Dame Lawyer 217; (1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 654.29Tschida v. Tschida, (1927) 170 Minn. 235, 237, 212 N. W. 193, 194.3OThe court cited: Van Camp v. Van Camp, (1921) 53 Cal. App.
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cases cited on behalf of the wife. 1 Of these cases, the court said:
"Both cases were decided on demurrers holding that the
cruelty charged amounted to no more than flirting with persons
of the opposite sex."'32
thus indicating that the conduct of the guilty spouse, if not
actual adultery, must, at least, be a close approximation thereto.
Two other species of conduct have been urged on the court
but rejected. In Dion v. Dion33 the wife sued for divorce on the
ground that the husband had been committed to the state re-
formatory. This was refused, the court refusing to interpret the
words "state prison," as the statute then read,3 4 to include the
reformatory. On rehearing, the plaintiff raised the suggestion
that this was cruelty. This suggestion the court briefly rejected,
saying:
"We cannot adopt this view. Clearly, neither the involuntary
submission to a sentence of the court by a party convicted of a
crime or the act of committing such crime, when it does not direct-
ly involve his wife, can be treated as a cruel or inhuman act on
his part toward her."3 5
When viewed in the light of the cases wherein "nagging," 0
or bad language37 were held to be cruelty, this decision seems out
of line. It is submitted that the possibilities (for it must be re-
membered that the court is holding that this never can be cruelty)
of such conduct seriously affecting the wife are at least as great
17, 199 Pac. 885; Craig v. Craig, (1905) 129 Iowa 192. 105 N. W. 446;
Atchinson v. Atchinson, (1896) 99 Iowa 93, 68 N. W. 573; Burns v.
Burns, (1917) 173 Ky. 105, 190 S. W. 683; Eistedt v. Eistedt, (1915) 187
Mich. 371, 153 N. W. 676; Bearinger v. Bearinger, (1912) 170 Mich. 661,
136 N. W. 1117; Hofmann v. Hofmann, (1921) 232 N. Y. 215, 133 N .E.
450; Holm v. Holm, (1914) 44 Utah 242, 139 Pac. 937. The Iowa cases
cited are discussed in Kingsley, Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in Iowa,
(1929) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 266, 276-277, the Michigan cases in Kingsley,
Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in thi State of Michigan, (1929) 8 Mich.
State Bar Jour. *196, *204-*205, and the New York cases in (1922) 7
Cornell L. Q. 258. It should be noticed that, of the cases cited, the
Eistedt and Hofmann Cases involved actual, proved adultery.
3
'Hancock v. Hancock, (1908) 55 Fla. 680, 45 So. 1020, 15 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 670, and Benson v. Benson, (1915) 45 Utah 514, 146 Pac. 564.
32Tschida v. Tschida, (1927) 170 Minn. 235, 238, 212 N. W. 193, 194.
33(1904) 92 Minn. 278, 100 N. W. 4 and 1101.
34Minn. G. S. 1894, sec. 4790(4). It should be noticed that, the next
year, the Revised Laws of 1905 expressly included commitment to the
state reformatory. Minn. Rev. L. 1905, sec. 3574(4). The section was
again amended, on a different point, in 1909: Minn. Laws 1909, oh. 443,
sec. 1(4), to read as it stands at present. Mason's 1927 Minn, Stat., sec.
8585(4).
35Dion v. Dion, (1904) 92 Minn. 278, 279-280, 100 N. W. 1101.
3GInfra, footnote no. 52.
371nfra, footnote no. 51.
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as in the situations in which mental cruelty is recognized. The
explanation probably lies in a hesitancy on the part of the court
to treat a type of conduct, not quite meeting the legislatively es-
tablished standard for one ground of divorce, as a ground under
a different name. But such an attitude seems erroneous. Im-
prisonment for crime is made a ground for divorce irrespective
of any effect on the other spouse. But to have held this conduct
"cruel" would still have left it to the plaintiff to prove that the
subjective tests had been met. Hence the seeming relaxation of
legislative standards would have been off-set by the introduction
of a new requirement, not present in the ground approximated.
The last situation of this type is the refusal of intercourse.
This, likewise, has arisen in but one case. Scgelbaum v. Segel-
baum. 38 The trial court had found that the wife, although she
had cohabited with the husband, had for a period of years refused
to have marital intercourse. The husband urged that this was a
ground for divorce; but the supreme court, after referring to the
fact that the English action for restitution of conjugal rights lay
only to compel cohabitation and not to compel marital intercourse,
said:
"... the tenor of the American decisions . . . is not to recog-
nize the denial of marital intercourse by either of the parties as
in itself a ground of divorce, either under the head of 'desertion'
or 'cruelty.' "s9
In so far as it held that such refusal was not desertion, the
court was correct historically, and in accord with the weight of
authority ;40 but in holding that such conduct never can constitute
cruelty, the court runs counter to a well settled group of cases in
at least one jurisdiction.41 Again, it is submitted, the court has
38(1888) 39 Minn. 258, 39 N. W. 492.
39Segelbaum v. Segelbaum, (1888) 39 Minn. 258, 260, 39 N. W. 492, 493.4
°For some discussions of the refusal of marital intercourse as con-
stituting desertion, consult: (1920) 69 Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. 77; (1923)
22 Mich. L. Rev. 166; (1925) 10 Cornell L. Q. 374; (1925) 25 Col. L.
Rev. 105; (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 404. The whole question is annotatcd
in Moll. Sexual Abnormalities as Factors in Divorce Cases, (1923) 40
Medico-Legal J. 128. Cf.: Mirizio v. Mirizio, (1926) 242 N. Y. 74. 150
N. E. 605, affg (1925) 212 App. Div. 524, 209 N. Y. S. 117. discussed in:(1926) 74 Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. 851; (1926) 6 Boston Univ. L. Rev.
195; (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 778; (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 758; (1926) 3 Wis.
L. Rev. 488.
In at least one state, such conduct has been declared by statute to
constitute desertion. Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 96.
41Michigan: consult: Menger v. Menger, (1890) 83 Mich. 319. 47
N. W. 219, 21 Am. St. Rep. 605; Whitaker v. Whitaker, (1896) 111 Mich.
202, 69 N. W. 151; Murnon v. Murnon. (1901) 128 Mich. 680. 87 N. W.
1039, 8 Detroit L. N. 861; Wercode v. Wercode, (1907) 147 Mich. 398, 110
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erred in holding that such conduct, where unjustified and long
continued-for the refusal should, undoubtedly, be so limited-
is not objectively cruel.
Turning from these cases of acts which are almost, although
not quite, grounds for divorce under other designations, we turn
to conduct which is attackable solely as constituting cruelty.
Probably the clearest case of such misconduct-certainly the one
most readily acted upon by the courts-is defamation. In what
seems to be the earliest Minnesota case to attempt to designate
what acts constitute cruelty, the court held that an unfounded
charge of adultery, publicly made by a husband against his wife,
was cruelty,4" and this holding has been adhered to in all subse-
quent cases.43 In the famous case of Williams v. Williams,44 the
situation was reversed, the charges having been made by the wife
to her husband. The court held this, likewise, to be cruel,45 al-
though it indicated that it would require stronger proof of the sub-
jective element.4"
But, although this is the commonest form of defamation be-
tween spouses, there is no indication that the doctrine is limited
to this charge. In Longbotham v. Longbotham47 a false allegation
of commitment to an insane asylum, and in Taylor v. Taylor,48
an allegation that the wife falsely had charged her husband with
non-support were treated as of sufficient legal merit to justify
consideration (although, in the end, the court found the allegation
N. W. 942; Wagner v. Wagner, (1918) 203 Mich. 328, 168 N. W. 1019;
discussed in Kingsley, Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in the State of
Michigan, (1929) 8 Mich. State Bar Jour. *196, *205-*207.42Wagner v. Wagner, (1886) 36 Minn. 239, 30 N. W. 766.
43Clark v. Clark, (1902) 86 Minn. 249, 90 N. W. 390; Cochran v.
Cochran, (1904) 93 Minn. 284, 101 N. W. 179 (vile and obscene language,
battery); Longbotham v. Longbotham, (1912) 119 Minn. 139, 137 N. W.
387 (assault and battery); Eaton v. Eaton, (1924) 161 Minn. 293, 201
N. W. 289; see: Colahan v. Colahan, (1902) 88 Minn. 94, 92 N. W. 1130,
where, however, the court found the charge was made on probable cause;
Jokela v. Jokela, (1910) 111 Minn. 403, 127 N. W. 391, where the court
found the conduct not subjectively cruel; and Gall v. Gall, (1925) 165
Minn. 291, 206 N. W. 450.
That the making of such charges is ground for limited divorce was
held in Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka, (1927) 171 Minn. 213, 213 N. W. 919.
44(1907) 101 Minn. 400, 112 N. W. 528.
4 5Accord: Hertz v. Hertz, (1914) 126 Minn. 65, 147 N. W. 825
(vile and obscene language, nagging) ; Brodsky v. Brodsky, (1927) 172
Minn. 250, 215 N. W. 181 (nagging); Eller v. Eller, (1930) 182 Minn.
133, 233 N. W. 823, discussed in (1931) 3 Dakota L. Rev. 384 (other
slander).
4"Consult, infra, footnotes nos. 61-63.
47(1912) 119 Minn. 139, 137 N. W. 387.
48(1929) 177 Minn. 428, 225 N. W. 287.
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untrue in the first case, and the charge well-founded in the second).
And the making of such charges, if the essential subjective
elements-principally here lack of probable cause-be present, is
cruel even though they are made in the pleadings in divorce actions
between the parties.49
In these cases, the damaging effect of the conduct is caused, or
at least intensified, by the fact that it creates public disfavor. Is
it enough that the defendant has been guilty of a course of con-
duct which, although carried on in private, nevertheless creates
injured feelings on the part of the other spouse? Such private
acts as have been raised in litigation seem to fall, roughly, into
five groups: (1) private charges of unchastity;50 (2) the use of
profane and abusive language;51 (3) nagging;52 (4) abuse of
third parties for whom the complainant has affection ;," and (5)
incompatibility.5 4 Of these, the first four have, sometimes alone,
but more usually in conjunction with other acts, been treated as
cruelty. In an early case55 the court recognized that, granting
the presence of subjective elements, nagging alone might be
4SConsult Gall v. Gall, (1925) 165 Minn. 291, 292, 206 N. W. 450,
where the court, granting a divorce on this ground in part said: "Without
at all trying to verify her admission . . . he began this action in which the
charges were made public."
5OEaton v. Eaton, (1924) 161 Minn. 293, 201 N. W. 289.51Westphal v. Westphal, (1900) 81 Minn. 242, 83 N. W. 988 (violence,
abuse of plaintiff's relatives); Cochran v. Cochran, (1904) 93 Minn. 284,
101 N. W. 179 (violence, public charges of adultery); Hertz v. Hertz,(1914) 126 Minn. 65, 147 N. W. 824 (nagging, false charges of adultery) ;
see: Heinze v. Heinze, (1909) 107 Minn. 43, 119 N. W. 489; and see
Colahan v. Colahan, (1902) 88 Minn. 94, 92 N. W. 1103, and Haver v.
Haver, (1907) 102 Minn. 235, 113 N. W. 382, where the language was held
to have been justified.
52 Marks v. Marks, (1894) 56 Minn. 264, 57 N. W. 651, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 466, and (1895) 62 Minn. 212, 64 N. W. 561; Hertz v. Hertz, (1914)
126 Minn. 65, 147 N. W. 825 (vile names, false charges of adultery);
Mullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179, 160 N. W. 494 (violence);
O'Neil v. O'Neil, (1921) 148 Minn. 381, 182 N. W. 438; Brodsky v.
Brodsky, (1927) 172 Minn. 250, 215 N. W. 181 (false charges of adultery) ;
James v. James, (1930) 179 Minn. 266, 229 N. W. 128; see: Segelbaum v.
Segelbaum, (1888) 39 Minn. 258, 39 N. W. 492; Heinze v. Heinze, (1909)
107 Minn. 43, 119 N. W. 489; Gilman v. Gilman, (1921) 150 Minn. 271,
185 N. W. 469; Dauer v. Dauer, (1926) 169 Minn. 148, 210 N. W. 878; as
a ground for a limited divorce, consult: Martinson v. Martinson, (1911)
116 Minn. 128, 133 N. W. 460; Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka, (1926) 171 Minn.
213, 213 N. W. 919.
53Westphal v. Westphal, (1900) 81 Minn. 242, 83 N. W. 988 (violence,
abusive language).
54Reibeling v. Reibeling, (1902) 85 Minn. 383, 88 N. W. 1103; but
see Widstrand v. Widstrand, (1902) 87 Minn. 136, 91 N. W. 432.
55Marks v. Marks, (1894) 56 Minn. 264, 57 N. W. 651, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 466, and (1895) 62 Minn. 212, 64 N. W. 561.
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cruelty, and this attitude has since been maintained,"0 the court
saying in a comparatively recent case :57
"An unvarying course of fault finding, insult and oppression,
unrelieved by a pleasant word, and persisted in for years, may
become more intolerable than blows . ".."8
But mere incompatibility, standing alone, has not been con-
sidered an adequate ground for absolute divorce,"8 although, in a
case seeking only a limited divorce, the court easily allowed the
separation.6
2. SUBJECTIVE CRUELTY
The discussion thus far has treated of conduct which, con-
sidered objectively-considered without reference to any particular
man and woman-has been classed by the court as "cruel." It
has been suggested, already, that, to justify a divorce for cruelty,
the conduct complained of must be not only cruel when tested by
an objective standard, but cruel subjectively-cruel when inflicted
by the particular defendant on the particular plaintiff.
As to the plaintiff, this requirement that the conduct be sub-
jectively cruel has long been recognized. In the first case to treat
"nagging" as objectively cruel,"" the court emphasized the need
for proof of the subjective element:
"Such a course of ill-treatment, long continued, where the
acts of the husband are studied and malicious, and the wife is
sensitive, may be cruel and inhuman treatment if it has a serious
effect on her health, or causes her great mental suffering; but the
effect on her must be of a serious character."02
56Consult the cases cited, supra, in footnote no. 52.
57Mullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179, 160 N. W. 494.
5
sMullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179, 182, 160 N. W. 494, 495,
and consult the further quotation from this case and from O'Neil v.
O'Neil, (1921) 148 Minn. 381, 182 N. W. 438, supra, in footnote no. 13.
59Reibeling v. Reibeling, (1902) 85 Minn. 383, 88 N. W. 1103; Baler
v. Baier, (1903) 91 Minn. 165, 97 N. W. 671.
6 0Widstrand v. Widstrand, (1902) 87 Minn. 136, 138, 91 N. W. 432,
433, the court saying: ". . . we do not find the record to disclose such a
persistent method or system of cruelty on the part of the defendant as wouldjustify an absolute divorce. . . . While the law cannot release people from
the marriage tie simply because they are unhappy, yet when it appears that
the interests of both parties would be conserved by a separation rather
than a continuation, there should be some relief; and the statute referred
to comprehends such cases. After considering the history of these parties,
their peculiarities, their repeated separations and reconciliations, their
differences in temperament, habits, and tastes, it seems to us that it would
be unwise to withhold the relief sought, especially since the health of
plaintiff has been affected. If nothing but misery is to be attained by
living together, then what warrant is there in compelling the continuance
of that existence?"
6 1Marks v. Marks, (1894) 56 Minn. 264, 57 N. W. 651.
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and this has been followed by similar language in subsequent
cases.
63
• The existence of this requirement of subjectivity has made it
necessary-at least in cases of "mental cruelty"-to consider in
some detail the manners and character of the plaintiff. For ex-
ample, in a case in which the objective cruelty consisted of un-
founded charges of unchastity, the court refused a divorce, saying:
"Her language, however, was much coarser than his own. She
was guilty of cruelty on her part. She assaulted him, it appears
practically without contradiction, in a manner which attained the
limit of disgusting indecency. Propriety precludes the detailed
narration of her misconduct, indecribable and insufferable. She
showed wrong on his part; but the record demonstrates that she
was in no position to complain."' 6
The cases on subjective cruelty are, unfortunately, somewhat
obscured in the opinions of appellate courts by the very fact that
they are courts of review. It is not always clear whether the court
is sustaining the action of the trial court because (1) the review-
ing court itself thinks the evidence showed (or did not show)
subjective cruelty; or (2) the reviewing court feels itself unjusti-
fied in reversing a finding on this point made by the trial court-
two approaches which are, of course, entirely different. There is,
however, adequate authority for the necessity of a finding on the
point by a trial court, and, while, here as elsewhere, the ordinary
inferences operate, so that some conduct at least would so normal-
ly be subjectively cruel that the mere evidence of the existence
of such conduct (objectively cruel) would support a finding that
it had been subjectively cruel, yet, it is submitted, a prudent
plaintiff would offer, in aid of any available inferences, definite
evidence of the subjective effects of the misconduct complained of.
When we turn to consider the extent of a requirement of
subjectivity as concerning the defendant, our problem may well
be* stated in more traditional terms as a matter of intent. Where
actual malice (that is, an actual intent to injure body or feelings)
can be shown, the problem is easy ;65 and, in addition, the existence
of malice, here as in other fields of law, may be inferred from
62Marks v. Marks, (1894) 56 Minn. 264, 266, 57 N. W. 651. (Italics
added.)6WSee, for example: Mullen v. Mullen, (1916) 135 Minn. 179, 160
N. W. 494, and the cases cited, infra, in footnote no. 64.64Jokela v. Jokela, (1910) 111 Minn. 403, 404, 127 N. W. 391 ; and see:
Clark v. Clark, (1902) 86 Minn. 249, 90 N. W. 390; Hayer v. Hayer,(1907) 102 Minn. 235, 113 N. W. 382.
65Marks v. Marks, (1895) 62 Minn. 212, 64 N. W. 561; Gall v. Gall,(1925) 165 Minn. 291, 206 N. W. 450.
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the party's conduct. And, again as elsewhere, a qualification must
be made: acts done in the heat of a sudden passion, provoked by
misconduct of the plaintiff, are not intentional or malicious, hence
not cruel.86
From this qualification follows a necessary converse: if the
defendant had no intent, either express or implied, to injure the
complainant, then his conduct, although it may have been cruel
objectively, will not justify a divorce.0 7 This rule operates in
two classes of cases.
If the defendant was, at the time of the alleged misconduct, so
insane as not to realize the nature of his act-the familiar "right
and wrong" test of the criminal law-then his conduct is not sub-
jectively "cruel." This situation was first raised in Minnesota in
the case of Longbotham v. Longbolham. 8 In that case, the de-
fendant had attempted to amend his pleadings, during the trial,
so as to allege that he had been insane at the time of committing the
acts complained of. The supreme court sustained the trial court
in its refusal to permit the amendment, on the ground that such
amendments were within the discretion of the trial court, which
did not appear to have been abused. Incidentally, however, the
court said:
"Insanity is a defense to an action for a divorce on the ground
of cruel and inhuman treatment, if at the time the alleged acts of
cruelty were committed the defendant was laboring tinder such a
defect of reason as not to know the nature of his acts or that they
were wrong."0 9
This dictum was followed, a few years later, by actual holding
in Kunz v. Kun, 7 0 the court saying:
"The finding of cruel and inhuman treatment of plaintiff by
defendant would have ample support in the evidence were it not
plain that all defendant's conduct, which furnishes the basis for
the finding adverse to her, is but the symptom and result of a
disordered mind. It is a typical case of delusional insanity, its
first manifestation having as a subject matter the two persons
66Colahan v. Colahan, (1902) 88 Minn. 94, 92 N. W. 1130.
67Widstrand v. Widstrand, (1902) 87 Minn. 136, 137, 91 N. W. 432,
433: ". . . We do not find the record to disclose such a ... s ,stem of cruelty
on the part of the defendant as would justify an absolute divorce." (Italics
added.) Dion v. Dion, (1904) 92 Minn. 278, 279-280, 100 N. W. 1101:
"... clearly ... the involuntary submission to a sentence of the court by a
party convicted of a crime . . . can [not] be treated as a cruel or inhuman
act on his part toward her." (Italics added.)
68(1912) 119 Minn. 139, 137 N. W. 387.
69 Longbotham v. Longbotham, (1912) 119 Minn. 139, 142, 137 N. W.
387, 389.
70(1927) 171 Minn. 258, 43 N. W. 906.
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nearest defendant's heart .... However serious, from plaintiff's
standpoint, the situation may be, to whatever extent he has been
unjustly accused and otherwise harassed, he is not entitled to a
divorce. That is for the simple reason that his wife's conduct,
of which he now complains, is explainable on no other hypothesis
than that of aberration. Insanity itself not being a ground for
divorce, its symptoms and results cannot have that effect. In-
sanity is a mental disease, and disease of the mind no more than
illness to the body is recognized by the law of this State as ground
for divorce. 'If insanity itself after marriage is no cause for
divorce, nothing which is the consequence of it can be.' ... Any
change of the law in that respect must come from the Legislature
rather than the court." 71
It is this same doctrine that the conduct must have been in-
tentionally cruel, it is submitted, which supports the rule that the
making of false charges against the complainant is not cruelty
if the defendant made them under a reasonable belief in their
truth.72
71Kunz v. Kunz, (1927) 171 Minn. 258, 258-259, 213 N. W. 906.72Hertz v. Hertz, (1914) 126 Minn. 65, 67, 147 N. IV. 825, 826;
"There was no attempt to show that ... [the] . .. charges were true, or
that she had reasonable ground for her evident conviction that her husband
was unfaithful;" Taylor v. Taylor, (1929) 177 Minn. 428, 432, 225 N. W.
287, 289: "Her conduct was not malicious, but was at least such as she
believed necessary and proper. Her action in this respect was had
through the office of the district attorney of Brown County, Wisconsin.
It was obviously in good faith;" see: Wagner v. Wagner, (1896) 36
Minm. 239, 30 N. W. 766.
